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I. Introduction
The rise and decline of private sector unionization were among the more important fea
tures of the U.S. labor market during the twentieth century. Following a dramatic spurt
in unionization after passage of the depression-era National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) of 1935, union density peaked in the mid- 1950s, and then began a continuous
decline. At the end of the century, the percentage of private wage and salary workers
who were union members was less than I 0 percent, not greatly different from union
density prior to the NLRA.
An emerging consensus among industrial relations scholars is that absent a major
shift in worker attitudes regarding capitalism, individualism, and the state, accompanied
in turn by changes in the legal structure, there can be no rebound in traditional union
ization. 1 The status quo is not an altogether attractive scenario, however, even for those
not enamored with the contribution that unions, in their current form, make to social
welfare. More of the same means that in the shrinking unionized sector we retain a sys
tem that is overly confrontational and does too little to facilitate value-enhancing behav
ior among management and unions. More of the same means that employees in most
workplaces will have few outlets for collective voice and participation and that compa
nies will be constrained in their ability to promote and facilitate the exercise of voice.
And more of the same means continuing a growing reliance on governmental regulation
and the courts to set economy-wide workplace standards, reducing the role of enter
prise-level bargaining (implicit and explicit) between employers and their work forces.
Our purpose is to examine the relationship between private sector union density
and the wage premium, identifying where we have been and where we may go in the
future. 2 The starti ng point is the fact that labor unions are in decline and now represent
a small proportion of the private sector work force. This trend poses a dilemma for
society, workers, and public policy. Although the effects of unions in the workplace
vary enormously, our reading of the evidence is that on balance unions are detrimental
to company performance and economic efficiency. But in addition to unions' negative
effects, union representation and collective bargaining provide workers with varying
degrees of workplace democracy, collective voice, monitoring of working conditions,
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protection from discrimination, and enforcement of contractual provisions. For the 90
percent of private sector workers who are not unionized, effective worker voice and
participation are provided at less than efficient levels. And there is a substantial reliance
on governmental regulations and workplace mandates, accompanied by a litigious
enforcement process.
There are various reasons why unions are in decline. Herein, we focus on the link
between what is surely one of unions' principal functions, raising wages and other forms
of compensation, and the consequent decline in their membership and coverage. We
conclude that unions (and society) are caught in a cruel paradox. As long as the U.S.
remains a competitive, open economy with a decentralized, partially organized collec
tive bargaining system, the attempt by unions to acquire and maintain high wages
ensures that the union sector will remain small. Our conclusion is similar to that of Free
man and Medoff ( 1984, pp. 248-5 1), who argue that the "monopoly" face of unionism
is putting the organized labor movement and "collective voice" out of business. From
society's point of view, the monopoly face should be blunted and the voice face empha
sized. In a final section of the paper, we conclude that tweaking the current system of
labor law is unlikely to accomplish to a satisfactory degree the "less monopoly/more
voice" outcome. Rather, we discuss the desirability of a more fundamental shift involv
ing "conditional deregulation" or a change in the default workplace governance struc
ture. The goal of such fundamental reform is to substantially enhance collective voice
in the largely nonunion private sector, while at the same time constraining those forms
of worker rent seeking deleterious to economy-wide economic performance.
II. The Decline in Private Sector Union Density: A Summary
Following peak membership density during the 1950s (Freeman, 1997; Troy and Shef
lin, 1985), the percent of private nonagricultural wage and salary workers who are
union members stood at 24.6 percent in 1973, 16.8 percent in 1983, and at 9.5 percent
in 1999. Private nonagricultural union membership was 14.9, 1 1.9, and 9.4 million dur
ing 1973, 1983, and 1999 (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Table 1c). 3 In Figure 1, we
show union membership and density in the private sector for the years 1973- 1999.
Readily evident is the steep decline in density during the 1980s, a decline continuing
through today, albeit at a slower pace.
As discussed subsequently, some of the union decline is structural, owing to
employment shifts out of heavily unionized industries into less unionized ones. Yet one
sees a sizable decline within industries as well. Figure 2 shows unionization within the
manufacturing sector, as well as the share of total private wage and salary employment
accounted for by manufacturing. Manufacturing as a percent of private nonagricultural
employment declined from 33.2 percent in 1973 to 19.7 percent in 1999. Union den
sity declined from 38.9 percent in 1973, to 27.8 percent in 1983, and to 15.6 percent in
1999 (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Tables lc- ld). Not only has manufacturing
employment become less important over time, but union density within the manufac
turing sector also declined sharply over the last quarter century.
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Figure 1

Union Membership and Density, Private Nonagricultural Workers
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Source: Data are from Hirsch and Macpherson (2000. Table I c) for the years 1973 to 1999. Union membership

is the number of private sector. nonagricultural. wage and salary workers who are union members (in millions).
Density is the percentage of private sector, nonagricultural, wage and salary workers who are union members.

An important determinant of changes in union density is the ability of unions to
organize new members. Figures 3a and 3b (from Farber and Western, 2000) provide
information compiled on the number of NLRB certification elections and the total votes
cast in these elections. The number of union representation elections fell suddenly and
sharply in the early 1980s, coinciding with President Reagan's firing of unionized
(PATCO) air controllers who had gone out on strike.4 The number of NLRB union cer
tification elections fell from a level of about 8,000 a year in 1980 to about 4,400 in
1 990. The level of election activity declined a bit through the later 1980s and early
1990s, but has increased modestly following the AFL-CIO's emphasis on organizing
since John Sweeney became president. Votes cast in these elections fell by more than
half over the same period, from about 500,000 a year to just over 200,000 a year. The
larger percentage decline in number of votes than elections reflects the declining aver
age size of the election or workplace unit over time.
The news on union organizing is even worse than is evident in the election data.
As seen in Figure 4 (Farber and Western, 2000), union win rates in certification elec
tions declined steadily, from a win rate of about 80 percent in 1940 to about 50 percent
by 1975 .5 Since 1975, the win rate has hovered just at or below 50 percent in most
years. Moreover, not only has the average size of election units fallen over time, union
win rates are lower in larger workplace units. And this size gap in win rates has
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Figure 2

Union Membership, Density, and Employment, in Private Manufacturing
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Source: Data are from Hirsch and Macpherson (2000, Tables lc. ld) for the years 1973 to 1999. Union membership
is the number of private sector manufacturing, wage and salary workers who are union members (in millions). Den
sity is the percentage of private sector manufacturing, wage and salary workers who are union members. % Manu
facturing is the percentage of total private nonagricultural employment in manufacturing.

increased over time (Farber, 2001). Although good data are not available, most evi
dence indicates that even among the union elections wins, fewer have culminated in a
first contract between the union and employer. 6
In short, the number of union elections has declined, the average size of the elec
tion unit has fallen, the average win rate has dropped, particularly for large units, and
first contracts have become less likely following a union win. Efforts at reversing these
trends are underway. But even a substantial increase in the number of new workers
organized and first contracts obtained will not stabilize private sector union density at
its current level. Private sector union density will continue to decline until it reaches a
lower, sustainable level.
III. Why Has Private Sector Unionism Declined?
There is no shortage of explanations for why private sector unionism has fallen. Among
the reasons given for union decline are: structural change, the response to union wage
premiums in an increasingly competitive U.S. economy, increased management oppo
sition, less favorable interpretation and enforcement of labor laws by the NLRB, less
positive union sentiment among organizable workers, and the substitution of public
workplace mandates and regulation for collective bargaining.
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The Number of NLRB Certification Elections
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Figure 4

Union Win Rates and Pro-Union Vote Shares in NLRB Elections,
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Our focus is the relationship between the union wage premium and subsequent
union density. The wage premium or, more broadly, the firm's compensation structure
is a principal avenue through which unions "tax" firm profits and influence the eco
nomic health of firms. As discussed below, several of the explanations for the decline
in density (e.g. , management opposition, increasing competition) have an economic
basis. Union strength not only helps determine wages. Union wages in tum influence
union organizing success, company performance and growth, and, therefore, the long
run level of union density.
As seen below, a useful way to analyze changes in union density is an "account
ing" stock-flow framework in which changes in density reflect flows into and out of
the stock of union and nonunion employment (Dickens and Leonard, 1985; Freeman,
1988; Farber and Western, 2000). Job attrition produces a flow out of union employ
ment. Job growth in existing workplaces provides flows into union and nonunion
employment. Job growth taking place in new workplaces is almost entirely nonunion,
at least initially. NLRB certification elections and subsequent first contracts lead to
flows into union employment, while decertification elections lead to (small) flows out
of union employment.
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The various explanations for union decline are not mutually exclusive, and each
is plausible. Some work primarily through their influence on employer behavior (e.g.,
economic competitiveness, most forms of structural change), whereas others influence
worker demand for collective bargaining (e.g., union sentiment, the substitution of pub
lic regulation). Even taken together, however, these factors may be insufficient to
account fully for the fall in private sector unionization. We concur with the view that a
broader historical look at the rise and decline of unionism during the twentieth century
is needed to understand important social and political forces that shaped both the sud
den rise and the gradual but continuous decline of unions (Freeman, 1997; Lipset and
Katchanovski, 2001).

Structural Change and Union Organizing. Structural change can include changes
in industry and occupation, the demographic structure of the labor force, and the
regional location ofjobs. By structural change we mean union employment changes due
to shifts in labor demand or supply, independent of changes in union wages. Jobs have
moved out of heavily unionized manufacturing and into industries such as trade and
services with traditionally low union density. Changes in technology have led to smaller
employment shares in blue-collar or production jobs and larger employment in non
production occupations. Female workers are less likely to be unionized and the share
of women in the labor force increased markedly. And substantial employment growth
has occurred in the South and Southwest, where union density is traditionally low.
Empirically, it is of course difficult to distinguish structural changes affecting union
employment from the responses of firms to changes in union wages.
The structural explanation has obvious appeal. Yet it receives surprisingly little
support from analysts, who have argued that structural change cannot explain all or
even most of the change in unionization. As evidence, authors have pointed to Canada
and, to a lesser extent, other countries, which have witnessed structural shifts in indus
try, occupation, and demographics similar to those in the U.S . Unlike the U.S., Canada
and other countries have not seen much of a decline in union density (Freeman and
Medoff; 1984; Weiler, 1990; Riddell, 1993). These authors emphasize that the U.S.
experience is unique, focusing in particular on management opposition, the rise in unfair
labor practices, and organizing difficulties faced by unions given U . S . labor law. Troy
(1992, 2000), however, has emphasized that the comparison to Canada is misleading
given the importance and growth of the public and quasi-public sectors (e.g., health
care) in Canada. If one could isolate Canada's unregulated private sector one would
also see a decline in union density, although at a slower rate than in the U . S .
A more direct assessment o f the effect o f structural change can b e obtained using
CPS data with worker characteristics. Farber and Krueger (1993) estimate linear prob
ability models showing the probability of union membership, with and without controls
for occupation, industry, and individual characteristics, for the years 1977, 1984, and
1991. Structural controls can account for about 35 percent of the union decline between
1977 and 1984, but less than 10 percent of the decline between 1984 and 1991.
Union accounting studies also shed light on the role of structural change, although
its precise effect cannot be directly identified. Dickens and Leonard (1985) examine the
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period 1950-1979 and conclude that union decline stems primarily from a fall in organ
izing and success rates and only modestly from "economic" factors. This approach
probably understates the effect of structural change, since part of the decrease in suc
cessful organizing is a result of structural changes in industry, occupation, region, and
(to a lesser extent) demographics. Dickens and Leonard shift the focus to organizing,
finding that it had steadily fallen throughout most of the period and was insufficient to
offset the natural attrition rate of union jobs. Note that their study period ended prior
to the sharp drop in organizing in the early 1 980s. Freeman and Medoff ( 1984) used a
similar framework and predicted (correctly) that private sector union density would fall
to a new steady state around 1 0 percent, given 1970s organizing rates. The lower new
organizing rates since the early 1 980s are leading to a new steady-state density below
1 0 percent.
Farber and Western (2000) calculate that given current organizing rates and rates
of union and nonunion employment growth, steady-state private sector density will be
less than 5 percent. 7 They find that much of the recent decline is fueled by the slow net
growth in union relative to nonunion employment. This result lends credence to the
structural explanation, although slow net employment growth no doubt reflects other
factors, such as increased competitiveness. One way to think about this result is that the
steady decline in organizing prior to 198 1 is a vital factor in explaining the long-run
decline in private sector density. The sharp drop in organizing in the early 1 980s ratch
eted downward the sustainable rate of private sector union density from some level
around 10 percent to a level closer to 5 percent. Farber and Western conclude that even
if organizing had maintained its level from the early 1980s, private sector union den
sity would have fallen to a level just 2.5 percentage points higher than it is currently.
Because organizing levels have been so low since the early 1980s, changes in pri
vate sector density are most sensitive to differential rates in the net growth of union
and nonunion employment. Even substantial increases in new organizing would have
rather modest effects on union density. Farber and Western (2000) provide several coun
terfactual scenarios. What is clear is that to have avoided the decline in union density,
new organizing would had to have been far higher than current levels. There is no obvi
ous way that this could have happened. Organizing is costly, and the union base is
shrinking. Although new organizing has fallen, organizing expenditures per union
member have not. In short, the modest increase in organizing since John Sweeney
assumed the presidency of the AFL-CIO has slowed the decline in private sector den
sity, but it has not and probably cannot stop the decline. Absent large unanticipated
shifts in organizing costs and worker support for unions, private sector density should
decline further before it reaches a sustainable level.

Union Wage Premiums and the Competitiveness of the U.S. Economy. In order for
unions to capture rents for their members, they must either directly increase workplace
productivity (beyond what those same workers would produce and earn elsewhere),
appropriate some share of owners' surplus stemming from market power of the firm, or
tax some portion of the firm's normal returns. Although unionization no doubt leads to
productivity increases in many workplaces, on average these effects appear to be close
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to zero, and certainly insufficient to offset wage increases. 8 In short, wage and com
pensation premiums are the principal avenue through which unions affect firm prof
itability, which in turn influences management behavior toward their unions and toward
new union organizing. This relationship is discussed more fully in a subsequent section.
Ideally, we would like to track over time union effects on profitability and relate this to
subsequent changes in union density. Time-consistent data on unions and profitability
are not available in standard data sets. But as we see subsequently, we can track union
wage premiums over time, thus permitting inferences to be drawn about union effects
on firm profitability.
The U . S . economy has also become more competitive over time owing to the
increased importance of international trade, changes in technology, and varying degrees
of deregulation in highly-unionized transportation industries (airlines, trucking, rail
roads) and utilities (telecommunications, electricity). The more competitive an indus
try, the less likely it is to sustain a sizable union premium. Stated alternatively, a given
wage premium will have more deleterious employment effects in more competitive
environments. In deregulated industries that are naturally competitive such as truck
ing, union density and wage premiums declined sharply (Hirsch and Macpherson,
1 998). In industries such as airlines, where entry is difficult and the union strike threat
is substantial, union density and wages have remained high, although decline was evi
dent through much of the 1990s (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000). 9
There is surprisingly little work relating union wage gains to subsequent changes
in union employment and membership. Linneman et al. ( 1 990) provide evidence that
industries with higher wage premiums experience slower employment growth. LaLonde
et al. (1996) show a strong negative relationship between union organizing elections and
subsequent employment growth. In the literature on unions and company financial per
formance, union coverage is associated with slower growth, decreased profitability, and
lower investment in physical capital and R&D (for a survey, see Hirsch, 1997) . 10
Although the "union tax" clearly retards employment and sales growth in covered sec
tors, it does not appear to be associated with higher rates of business failure (Freeman
and Kleiner, 1 999; Dunne and Macpherson, 1 994). Strong unions may push a firm
toward the cliff's edge, but they will accept concessions and demonstrate flexibility
before pushing it over the edge.11
As long as competitive pressures remain strong in the private sector, the prospect
for resurgence in union density remains dim. Decreased resistance from management
would require a sharp increase in pro-union sentiment among its workers and a shift in
unionism's workplace impact away from rent appropriation and toward creation of
value added. Such cooperation is unlikely given a collective bargaining framework
predicated more on confrontation than cooperation and as long as rank-and-file support
for unions depends on their ability to capture rents. Value-added unionism requires
innovations and greater flexibility in labor law, among other things, which in turn might
facilitate more effective voice and enhanced cooperation between management and
labor (Estreicher, 1 996).
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Management Opposition and the NLRB. Both union leaders and academic
researchers (Weiler, 1990; Freeman and Medoff, 1 984; Freeman, 1 988) have identified
management opposition to organization, unfair labor practices, and unfavorable rul
ings from the NLRB as important sources of union decline. These issues are difficult
to assess. There is little doubt that anti-union sentiment is widespread among U . S . own
ers and managers of nonunion companies and that business opposition to union organ
izing has increased over time. Elections are more heavily contested than in the past,
unfair labor practices are not uncommon, and fewer union wins culminate in first con
tracts. It need not follow, however, that changes in managerial opposition account for
very much of the decline in private sector density. Anti-union sentiment from business
is hardly new, although it appears to have become more respectable as union density has
declined. Opposition to organizing is in part the result of union wage premiums and the
competitiveness of the economic environment. Even if union wage premiums were con
stant, management opposition may increase owing to lower levels of unionization
among firms' domestic and international competitors. No clear link can be found
between the decline in organizing and decisions of the Dotson-led Board during the
Reagan administration (Flanagan, 1 987; Farber and Western, 2000). Organizing diffi
culties have not gone away despite a more favorable Board during the Clinton admin
istration. Likewise, private sector union decline began prior to the 1 980s, a decline
difficult to link directly to the makeup of the NLRB .12
Although union density would no doubt be higher if business opposition were less
intense, the fundamental point is that management will continue to oppose union organ
izing as long as it is economically sensible to do so. It frequently is, particularly in a
highly competitive world in which most of one's competitors are nonunion. Although
the precise impact of unions on productivity is anything but clear, all evidence points
to a negative effect of unions on profits (Addison and Hirsch, 1 989; Kuhn, 1 998). Stated
alternatively, union effects on productivity are not sufficient to offset union wage
increases. If unions did not tax profits or if union density were industry-wide, man
agement opposition would be less substantial. It is difficult to imagine a major reduc
tion in management opposition to organizing absent a change in the union impact on
the bottom line or a major shift toward more pro-union sentiment among nonunion
workers. A shift in worker sentiment regarding unions would directly influence
employer behavior during organizing drives and make politically possible changes in
labor law and its enforcement.

Worker Attitude and Preferences. Work by Farber ( 1 990) and Farber and Krueger
(1 992) has concluded that weakened preferences for unionism explain much of the
decline over time. Lipset and Katchanovski (200 1 ) measure preferences associated with
social democratic or collectivist values, as compared to individualistic values. They
conclude that more than in other countries, U.S. workers tend to be far more individu
alistic and that this perspective helps explain the low levels of private sector density.
The thesis that worker attitudes are an important explanation for the rise and
decline of U.S. unionism receives considerable support when one views this over a long
historical period. As emphasized by Freeman ( 1 997), unionization in the U.S. occurred
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in large spurts in the late 1930s, following passage of the NLRA in 1 935 and its accept
ance by the Supreme Court in 1937, and after World War II. Passage of the NLRA and
the spurts in unionization were made possible by a sea change in attitudes that occurred
during the depression era. Capitalism was seen as inherently unstable, with workers
being largely unprotected victims, while collectivist alternatives were seen in a rela
tively positive light. Although individualism remained very much alive, its prominence
was on the wane and far from fashionable. 13
As argued persuasively by Freeman ( 1 997), it was this shift in attitude that made
politically possible passage of the NLRA, guaranteed majority support for unions across
thousands of workplaces, and broke down strong management resistance to unions.
Business leaders might remain opposed to unions, but they could not wear anti-union
sentiment on their sleeves. Once unionization reached a sufficiently high threshold, the
deleterious impact of unions on individual firm profitability, growth, and survival was
small. In short, the costs of opposing union organizing rose while the economic bene
fits fell. Following the initial spurts in union growth, there has been a continual long
run decline in density as workers' and voters' faith in capitalism has grown and attitudes
have moved once again toward an ethos of individuality. As private sector unioniza
tion fell to lower densities, the economic and social calculus for management shifted
toward a stronger resistance to union organizing.
The implication of the above analysis is that private sector union density will
remain at a low steady state absent a major shift in the public's attitude toward collec
tivism. Only such a shift would break down management resistance or permit changes
in the letter, interpretation, and implementation of U . S . labor law. Neither industrial
relations scholars nor we can identify a scenario by which the U . S . private sector would
move from a low-density steady state to a high-density steady state. But few observers
in 1930 could have predicted the sharp rise in unionism that lay just ahead.
The discussion above emphasizes the individualistic strain running through U.S.
public opinion. Although this often translates into anti-union sentiment, such sentiment
is far from universal among nonunion workers. To the extent that there is opposition,
it is often animus to unionization in its current form. Surveys asking nonunion work
ers if they would vote for a union in their workplace find considerable support, although
not support sufficient to bring it about. Freeman and Rogers ( 1999) find substantial
support among workers for a greater voice and participation in the workplace. But most
want that voice to be exercised as part of a cooperative rather than confrontational rela
tionship with management. The 90 percent of private sector workers who are not union
ized are not well served by the current system, which often offers them a choice
between a confrontational unionized labor relations environment or a nonunion gover
nance structure with highly limited opportunities for worker voice and participation.

Government Regulation and Mandates As a Substitute for Unions: Cause or
Effect? Coinciding with the secular decline in union density has been an expanded role
of government and the courts in providing workers, union and nonunion, with rights and
protections in the workplace. Employer mandates and regulations cover such things as

498

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH

discrimination, worker safety, overtime hours and pay, pension insurance, notice of
plant closings, and family leave. All workers receive "services" or protection that would
otherwise have been provided only to workers through the collective bargaining process.
As a result, benefits to workers from joining unions have fallen and organizing has
become more difficult. An irony here is that unions have been among the strongest pro
ponents of workplace regulation. 1 4
It is difficult to assess the impact of government regulations on union organizing,
although it seems likely that causation runs in both directions. 1 5 Not only has govern
ment's increased role in the workplace decreased worker support for unions, the decline
in private sector unionism has led to increased public support for workplace regula
tions. In addition, declining union density has weakened the political influence of organ
ized labor on legislation. Although unions have been notably unsuccessful in gaining
legislative victories that apply specifically to labor (union) law, they have had success
in pushing for workplace mandates that apply to both the union and nonunion work
force (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The important point here is that there exists a strong
demand by the public for many forms of protection in the workplace. The choice is not
one between a largely unionized labor market and a largely deregulated labor market.
Absent a strong role for collective bargaining or some alternative vehicle for the exer
cise of worker voice, we must rely instead on a regulated labor market characterized by
relatively inflexible rule-making, monitoring, and litigation (Schneider, 1997). The
desire among workers for greater voice and cooperation in their workplaces will remain
largely unfulfilled.
IV. Union Wage Premiums and Union Density: Theory
Despite a consensus that union organizing strength in the U . S . labor market has
declined, there is not a consensus on how union wage premiums have changed over
time. The issue is of some importance. The future course of unionization is tied in no
small part to "what unions do." Worker support for unions is predicated in part on their
ability to enhance compensation and working conditions, but the magnitude of the wage
premium in tum affects current and future employment (membership). The higher the
premium the greater will be employment growth in nonunion firms and the stronger will
be management resistance to union organizing. Union leaders face the unenviable posi
tion of responding to the demands of rank and file for higher compensation, knowing
that it will lead to lower employment and membership in the future. If union member
ship were determined solely by employer actions, maintaining union density at historic
levels necessarily would have required a sharp reduction in the wage premium. Taking
into account the role of workers, however, it does not follow that lower wage premiums
would have been sufficient to avoid union decline. All else the same, lower premiums
make workers less willing to join a union and pay union dues. Indeed, a lower wage pre
mium could conceivably decrease density in the long run if the negative effects from a
decline in worker support for new organizing were larger than the positive employment
effects of employer movement along their labor demand schedules and the reduction in
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resistance to union organizing. Although unlikely, one cannot reject a priori the asser
tion that current union wage premiums minimize the losses in union membership. 16
In order to examine the impact of the wage premium on union employment and
density, we next consider the predictions from standard union wage models. Although
union wage-employment outcomes need not be on the labor demand curve, the standard
union monopoly model is a useful starting place (Booth, 1995). The conclusions
reached in the standard model are then extended to alternative settings. The analysis
applies most directly to firms already unionized, taking into account the profit-maxi
mizing behavior of employers and the wage-employment preferences of union work
ers. It largely ignores the preferences of nonunion workers for new organizing. As
discussed previously, worker support for organizing is a positive function of compen
sation, while at the same time higher compensation increases management resistance
to organizing and decreases profit-maximizing employment levels.
In Figure 5, let DL represent employer demand for union labor, with We being the
competitive wage. The indifference curve U represents the preferences of the union
and its willingness to tradeoff wages and employment (membership). A common
approach is to treat union preferences as driven by a median voter concerned about the
wage and employment. Concern about employment as well as wages derives from the
median union worker's own unemployment risk or from concerns about union solidar
ity and the level of present and future union employment (Booth, 1995). The monop
oly union selects a wage Wu on DL reflecting its preferred wage-membership mix,
subject to the demand constraint (the tangency of indifference curve U with DL). For
our purposes, the important point is that given demandfor union labor, there is a neg
ative relationship between the union wage premium and membership. Absent labor
demand shifts, we should observe higher union wage premiums associated with declin
ing union density. 17
Employer demand for labor in unionized markets is likely to have decreased
because of increased competitiveness, labor saving technological change, weaker
enforcement of labor law, or the like. Such a shift, as shown in Figure 5 by the move
ment from DL to DL', is likely to lead to a wage-employment outcome associated with
a lower union wage and employment (W u' and Eu'). 18 To the extent that declining den
sity has resulted from shifting demand schedules for union labor, with little effect on
We, we should observe union wage gaps decreasing during a period of declining union
density. Alternatively, unions would see larger declines in membership were they to
maintain union wage premiums at previous levels. The important point is that if

employer demandfor union labor is shifting, union density and wage premiums rise or
fall together. This positive density-wage relationship contrasts with the effects of a

movement along a demand curve, where density and the wage premium are inversely
related. 19
Wage-employment outcomes need not be characterized by the union monopoly
model. The "right-to-manage" model (Booth, 1995) maintains the assumption of a set
tlement on the demand curve, but the position on the demand curve lies between � and
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Figure 5

Union Wage-Employment Determination
On and Off the Demand Curve
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Wu and is determined by the relative bargaining strength of management and the union.
But the inverse relationship between the union wage and membership continues to hold
for any given level of demand, while demand shifts lead to a positive relationship
between the wage gap and membership.
Settlements on the labor demand curve are not generally efficient for the parties.
That is, there exist settlements off the demand curve with higher employment and lower
wages that are preferred by both the union and management. Strong efficiency in bar
gaining leads to a vertical contract curve C starting at We with Ec employment and a
wage above We off the demand curve. In Figure 5, we draw that portion of the contract
curve in which both parties are better off, i.e., outcomes providing a higher union util
ity than U and a higher firm profit (the portion of C below the isoprofit curve, not shown
in Figure 5, that passes through Wu- E). In the strong efficiency case, there is no inverse
relationship between the wage and employment in the short run. In the long run, how
ever, union appropriation of quasi-rents leading to lower investment results in a lower
level of future output and employment (Abowd, 1 989a). So the inverse relationship
between wages and employment results even where contracts are strongly efficient.
Decreases in labor demand lead to efficient bargaining outcomes on C', implying lower
employment and most likely a lower union wage than on C. 20 It does not follow that
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bargaining can achieve settlements off the demand curve, however, let alone on a ver
tical contract curve. Evidence is far from clear-cut (Booth, 1 995; Kuhn, 1 998). Whether
union wage-employment outcomes are on or off the labor demand curve, declining
demand for union labor should result in a declining wage premium.
To this point, we have considered how movements along and shifts in labor
demand curves affect union wages and membership. Changes in union density at the
economy-wide or industry level also affect the wage premium. Union wages vary
directly with industry density owing to the effects of density on bargaining power and
labor demand elasticities. Nonunion wages vary inversely with density owing to labor
supply spillover effects and positively with density because of threat effects (Rosen,
1969). During a period of declining density, there is less of a spillover to the nonunion
sector and, hence, less downward pressure on nonunion wages. In this case, the union
nonunion wage gap unambiguously declines. Declining union density also decreases the
threat of union organizing in nonunion firms, putting downward pressure on nonunion
wages. If the union density effect is stronger among union than among nonunion work
ers, union premiums will decline. If the effects are equivalent among union and
nonunion workers. the wage gap will remain unchanged.
Empirical studies typically conclude that there exist substantial threat effects at the
industry level, whereas spillover effects are weak, and the positive relationship between
wages and industry density is somewhat stronger for union than nonunion workers
(Freeman and Medoff, 198 1 ). Based on this evidence, we should expect that during a
period of declining density, there exists downward pressure on the union wage gap. 21
Finally, the relationship between economy-wide union density and an average
union wage premium is ambiguous where unionized labor markets are heterogeneous.
Demand shifts are likely to have differential effects across labor markets and the aver
age union premium may increase or decrease. For example, increases in international
trade are likely to shift labor demand schedules (and change elasticities) differently
across markets. Assume that one obtains large losses in union employment in sectors
that are highly competitive and union premiums are low, and small employment loss in
sectors with high premiums. In this case, declines in union density could be accompa
nied by an increasing average union premium, even if premiums within all sectors
declined or remained the same.
V. Evidence on Union Wage Gaps, 1973-1999: Rising, Stable, or Falling?
Although there is general agreement that union wage premiums increased during the
late 1 970s, there is no consensus as to whether the union premium has been stable or
falling since the early 1 980s. B lanchflower ( 1 999) estimates union wage premiums
from the CPS for 1 983- 1 995. He concludes that the economy-wide union gap has
remained relatively constant, with no evidence of a trend. Bratsburg and Ragan ( 1 999)
also examine this issue, concluding that there has been little change in the overall union
premium, but dispersion in the premium across industries has declined as the U . S . econ
omy becomes more competitive. Hirsch and Macpherson estimate union wage premi-
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urns from the CPS for 1 973- 1 999 using a time-consistent specification. Economy-wide
they obtain a union premium estimate of . 1 72 log points in 1 983 and . 140 in 1 999, sug
gesting modest change. For the private sector, however, they obtain estimates of . 2 1 8
i n 1 983 and . 1 51 i n 1 999, a 7 percentage point decline i n the union wage premium.
Looking at the CPS evidence (from Hirsch and Macpherson) and published data from
the Employment Cost Index (ECI), Katz and Krueger ( 1 999, pp. 54-55) conclude that
the union wage premium has declined.
Herein we report time-consistent CPS evidence on union wage premium in the
private nonagricultural sector, from 1973 through 1 999. As discussed above, theory
does not provide an unambiguous prediction about the relationship between union
premiums and density. Falling density can be accompanied by either a rising or falling
wage premium. Based on evidence from the CPS and the ECI, we conclude that the
union wage advantage in the private sector has declined over the last 1 5-20 years. Con
clusions about the magnitude of the decline, however, are highly dependent on whether
one focuses on adjusted (i.e., regression-based) or unadjusted wage gap estimates and
whether one takes into account a bias that results from Census earnings imputation
procedures.
The principal data source for our evidence presented here is the Current Popula
tion Survey (CPS), the monthly survey of households conducted by the U.S . B ureau of
the Census. We summarize evidence presented in a recent paper by Hirsch and Schu
macher (2000), who provide union wage gap estimates for private nonagricultural work
ers from the May 1973-19 8 1 CPS and the 1983-1999 CPS-ORG (outgoing rotation
group) monthly earnings files. Logarithmic wage gap estimates are presented unad
justed and adjusted for CPS worker and job characteristics. The adjusted wage gap is
simply the coefficient on a union membership dummy variable from a log wage equa
tion with standard controls. 22 Hourly earnings are defined as usual weekly earnings
(inclusive of overtime, tips, and commissions) divided by usual hours worked per week.
Top coded earnings (at$999 in 1973- 1 988,$1,923 during 1989-1997, and$2,885 in
1 998- 1 999) are assigned the mean above the cap based on the assumption that the
upper tail of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto distribution.23 Controls included
are years of schooling, potential experience and its square (interacted with gender),
dummy variables for gender, race and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status,
region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (8), and occupation ( 1 2) .
Hirsch and Schumacher's (2000) principal contribution is showing the existence
of a systematic bias in some (but not all) types of wage gap estimates owing to the Cen
sus hot-deck imputation procedure used for those not reporting earnings. Including
workers whose earnings have been imputed by the Census causes a systematic down
ward bias in union wage premium estimates. The downward bias is large- more than
4 percentage points in recent years. Systematic bias results because union status is not
a match criterion used by the Census in selecting an earnings donor.24 Most union work
ers not reporting earnings have their earnings assigned based on a match to a nonunion
donor (biasing downward union wages), while some nonunion non-reporters are
assigned a union donor (biasing upward nonunion wages). Moreover, Census inclusion
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and delineation of imputed earners in the CPS research and public use files have not
been consistent over time, leading to variation in union premium estimates that have
nothing to do with actual movements in wages.
Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) construct a time-consistent union wage gap series
that nets out the effect of imputed earnings. Where possible, all workers whose earnings
have been imputed by the Census are omitted from the estimation sample. In those years
(or months) where allocated earners are not reliably identified, wage gap estimates are
adjusted to account for the bias. In Figure 6, we present their unadjusted and adjusted
wage gap estimates measuring log differentials between union and nonunion private
nonagricultural wage and salary workers. The unadjusted gaps are the difference in mean
log wages between union and nonunion workers. The adjusted gaps are regression esti
mates of the log wage differential, with the controls noted above. Both the adjusted
and unadjusted CPS estimates net out the effects of workers with imputed earnings.

Figure 6

Union-Nonunion Log Wage Gaps, Private Nonagricultural Sector
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Focusing attention first on the unadjusted or raw log wage differential, it rises
from about .33 log points in the early 1 970s to about .37 in the late 1 970s and early
1 980s. The rise in the differential through 1 978 has been noted in much of the previ
ous literature and cited as a source of increased management resistance to union organ
izing in the 1 980s. In the previous literature, the premium is found to drop sharply in
1 979 and throughout the early 1 980s. As Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) show, much
of the apparent decline is due to the fact that the CPS did not report allocated earnings
in the 1 973-1978 May CPS public use files, but did do so beginning in 1 979. Time-con
sistent treatment of allocated earners indicates that the union gap remained high
throughout the mid- 1 9 80s. Since the mid- 1 9 80s, however, there has been a decline.
From a level of .386 log points in 1 983 (the first year of the monthly CPS earnings
files), the differential has decreased a considerable . 1 1 log points - to .27 6 in 1 999. 25
Turning our attention to the adjusted union-nonunion wage differential, one sees
a similar qualitative pattern. The private sector union premium reached a high in the
1 983- 1 985 period. From a level of .236 log points in 1 983 and a high of .245 in 1 984,
the premium declined to about .2 1 in the early 1 990s, rose a bit in the mid-1 990s, and
then declined to .200 by 1 999, an overall decline of about .04 log points. Although
decline in the premium is clearly evident, it is small and far less marked than the sizable
. l l log point decline evident in the unadjusted wage series between 1 983 and 1 999.26
The difference between the adjusted and unadjusted wage gap estimates implies
that over time the average private sector union worker's bundle of measurable charac
teristics (e.g., schooling, demographic characteristics, broad occupation, etc.) has fallen
in value relative to the average nonunion worker's bundle. Hence there has been far
less change in regression estimates of the union wage differential than is evident in
union and nonunion wage rates unadjusted for measurable characteristics. Changes in
gender are likely to be particularly important. The proportion of union members who
are women has increased steadily over time. The increased frequency of female union
members pulls down the unadjusted wage gap, whereas it has little effect on the
adjusted gap since sex is included as a control variable (in effect, female union mem
bers are compared to female nonunion workers, and vice-versa).
Because of the difference in conclusions reached about the time pattern of the
union wage premium based on the CPS, it is useful to look for evidence from data
sources other than the CPS. Unfortunately, such a comparison is not conclusive since
overall wage trends in the CPS have differed from wage growth in the National Prod
uct Accounts (NIPA) and the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI). Moreover, the exact
sources of the differences in the alternative wage series are not well understood
(Bosworth and Perry, 1 994; Abraham et al., 1 999; Krueger, 1 999).
The ECI is a quarterly compensation survey administered by BLS, whose units of
observation are jobs (occupations) within establishments, which in turn are cross clas
sified by union status (among other things). We examine the ECI wage series for all pri
vate sector union and nonunion jobs. The ECI indices have fixed weights across jobs,
so changes should not reflect variation over time in the occupation or industry compo-
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sition. The ECI, however, does not account for changes in worker characteristics
(schooling, age, gender, etc.). The trend in the ECI union-nonunion log wage gap is
shown in Figure 6, with the ECI gap set equal to the unadjusted CPS gap for 1 983. The
ECI indicates substantially slower growth in union than in nonunion wages. Over the
1 983- 1 999 period, the slower growth in union wages implies a narrowing of the log
wage differential by approximately . 1 27 log points, or an average eight-tenths of one
percent a year.27 This is reasonably close to the . 1 1 log point drop in the unadjusted CPS
differential, but greatly exceeds the modest .04 log point decline in the adjusted wage
premium. What appears obvious from this comparison is that the ECI indices, while
holding constant the job structure, do not account for relative changes in worker char
acteristics. These characteristics do affect CPS regression-based wage gap estimates.
To gain further insight into what is driving the differences in CPS and ECI wage
changes, we examine (results not shown) whether changes in the aggregate CPS figures
result primarily from changes in industry employment, or from wage changes that are
roughly equivalent across broad industries. Such analysis is interesting in its own right,
since unionized labor markets need not be homogeneous. Our conclusion is clear. In the
CPS, disaggregation into seven broad private nonagriculatural sectors indicates that lit
tle of the decline is accounted for by employment shifts. Holding constant employment
shares at 1 973 levels but allowing wages to change, we obtained a pattern highly sim
ilar to that seen when both employment shares and wages are allowed to change. Sim
ilarly, there was little change in the wage premium when we held industry wage
premiums constant, but allowed employment weights to change. 28
Ultimately, we are unable tofully resolve differences between the ECI and CPS in
either the timing or the extent of change in the union-nonunion wage differential. It is
safe, however, to conclude that wage growth since the early 1 980s in the unionized sec
tor has been less than in the nonunion sector and, accordingly, the union wage premium
has fallen. Whether the decline in the premium is rather modest, as indicated by CPS
regression estimates, or more substantial, as indicated in ECI and unadjusted CPS fig
ures, remains unresolved. We lean toward the conclusion that the decline has been mod
est, based on CPS wage gap estimates accounting for worker characteristics.
Uncertainty about the magnitude of the union wage gap decline introduces a
degree of ambiguity into our interpretation of what has been happening in U.S. labor
markets. As argued previously, the simultaneous decline in union membership and rel
ative wages can be explained by inward demand shifts of the union labor demand curve
(Figure 5). If the decline in the union wage gap is substantial, as suggested by the ECI
or unadjusted gap, it is consistent with unions attaching a relatively large weight on
employment, permitting the gap to narrow in order to avoid even further losses in mem
bership. We believe it is more likely that narrowing of the union gap since the mid1 980s is modest, as seen in the CPS regression-based estimates. A roughly 4 percentage
point narrowing of the wage gap from a historically high level suggests that unions
(and their members with median preferences) have placed a high weight on maintain
ing their relative wage advantage, despite the concomitant loss in membership.
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Union emphasis on maintaining real wages also helps explain why the union pre
mium rose during the late 1 970s and early 1 980s, despite declining private sector den
sity. The suggestion is that a majority of the rank and file did not fully recognize how
strong were the competitive pressures facing unionized companies, or did recognize
these pressures and were willing to sustain substantial membership losses in order to
maintain wages.29 Because economy-wide wage growth was slow during this period,
particularly for male production workers, it is hardly surprising that there was not
stronger political support within unions for extensive wage concessions. Ultimately,
maintaining high wage premiums translated into larger membership losses than would
have occurred had wage concessions been more substantial.
An increasingly competitive economy during the 1 980s and 1 990s and greater
nonunion competition facing unionized companies not only shifted labor demand, but
also increased the elasticity of demand for union labor. The worsening trade-off between
wages and employment eventually resulted in moderate restraint among labor unions
and the narrowing union wage gap evident since the mid- 1 980s.
VI. No Unions, New Unions, or Beyond Unions?
In the future we will see a continuing decline in private sector union density, to a level
below the 1 999 rate of 9.4 percent (9.5 percent among private nonagricultural workers).
Despite modest narrowing in union wage premiums since the mid- l 980s, they remain
sizable so that union companies are less profitable than they would be absent a union
tax. In what is a highly competitive market environment, most nonunion establishments
will continue to actively oppose attempts at union organizing.
Continuation of current trends means that workers' desire for voice in the work
place, cooperation with management, and participation in decision making will remain
unrealized for much of the largely nonunion work force. There is likely to be a contin
ued reliance on government regulation and mandates in the workplace, a system that is
insufficiently flexible and overly litigious. Proposed labor law reforms could provide a
modest boost to union organizing and slow the current decline, but moderate increases
in new organizing will not boost union density above current levels. Labor law reforms
could improve fairness and mitigate the contentiousness of the union organizing
process. 30 The case for labor law reforms that substantially facilitate union organizing,
however, is weakened by what we believe to be on balance a deleterious impact of
unions, in their current form, on long-run economic performance. We would encour
age reforms within the union sector that might discourage rent seeking while enhanc
ing voice.3 1 But such reforms will have at most a modest effect on the steady-state level
of union density. In short, it is difficult to envision changes in labor (i.e., union) law that
will substantially improve workplace governance for the more than 90 percent of pri
vate sector workers not directly affected.
The description above is our best prediction for what the future holds. It is largely
a description of the status quo, with the addition of modest reforms in labor law and a
growing role for government in workplace regulation. This is not an altogether gloomy
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scenario. As long as workplace regulations do not become unduly onerous, such a future
would permit continued economic growth and an improvement in workers' standard of
living. The economic pie would get larger and competition among employers in the
labor market would ensure that most workers receive shares of the pie roughly com
mensurate with their economic contribution. But such a labor market will produce a less
than optimal level of worker voice and participation (Levine and Tyson, 1 990; Freeman
and Lazear, 1 995; Kaufman and Levine, 2000). In principle, we should be able to do
better. For this reason, we focus attention on proposals that might enhance voice among
nonunion workers. Whether beneficial changes can be identified and subsequently
adopted via our political process, however, is questionable.

Value-Enhancing Reform in Workplace Governance. In the remainder of the paper,
we briefly discuss the shape that value- or welfare-enhancing reforms might take. A
prerequisite for such a discussion is to identify the criteria that desirable labor and
employment law reforms should satisfy. We offer the following. Reforms: ( I ) should
be value enhancing for the parties and the economy;3 2 (2) should involve a greater role
for voice within nonunion as well as union workplaces; (3) should encourage cooper
ation between management, supervisors, and line workers; (4) should allow for varia
tion across heterogeneous workplaces; (5) should be flexible within workplaces over
time; and (6) should limit the rent seeking goals of unions (or other worker associations)
while enhancing provision of voice.
Absent major reforms, it is difficult to see how the current system can evolve
toward an employment governance structure embodying these six characteristics. Keep
ing in mind the criteria listed above, we discuss below two general approaches that
have the potential to be value enhancing. The first approach is termed conditional dereg
ulation, while the second involves a change in the labor law default from no union to
some alternative state. In each of these cases, a move away from a default governance
structure within the firm or the default regulatory structure requires approval of both
management and workers. The requirement for mutual agreement encourages devel
opment of value-enhancing alternatives, as compared to the default structure. It is not
our purpose to provide detailed proposals for these or other changes in employment
law and industrial relations. Rather, we briefly outline general approaches that we
believe might lead in the right direction.

Conditional Deregulation. We find particularly attractive changes along the lines
suggested by Levine ( 1995), who proposes a system of conditional deregulation. Levine
recognizes that there exists a large number of governmental mandates and regulatory
measures regarding workplace safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, dis
crimination, family leave, and the like. Under a system of conditional deregulation, the
default for all (or nearly all) firms would be that they are covered by the full extent of
these labor market regulations. These requirements would be divided into those that
are waivable and those non-waivable. Non-waivable rights would include some mini
mum set of standards (say, with respect to discrimination or safety) that could not be
waived by any employer. Conditional deregulation would permit employers to be
exempt from the waivable set of regulatory standards and be subject only to the mini-
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mum standards if they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with employee

oversight and approval.
In order to waive the regulations or "deregulate" workplace standards, firms must
have in place independent worker committees to perform the approval and oversight
functions. For firms that are unionized, the union would provide the employee voice that
has authority to waive government standards beyond the minimum (the employer must
also approve the waiver). For the majority of employers who are not unionized, worker
committees or councils would have to be created that would have authority to approve
the waiver on behalf of workers. A contentious issue would be the nature of the worker
committees and the permissible employer role. Unlike Levine, we would argue for abol
ishment or major reform of 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which restricts the creation of and role
for worker associations or groups other than traditional labor unions. We would permit
a reasonably active role for the firm in setting up such worker councils, as long as they
met minimum government requirements regarding independence, democratic choice
of worker spokespersons, secret balloting on key issues, and antidiscrimination provi
sions protecting workers active in the worker associations. 33
An important benefit of such an approach would be that it would spur the estab
lishment of worker associations throughout the private sector and provide a vehicle that
might enhance worker voice and cooperation between management and its work force.
In establishments where worker associations are formed, it is likely that their major
role will be to enhance worker voice. Such worker groups, however, can also serve as
a vehicle to transfer rents or quasi-rents from shareholders to workers, since their
approval of waiving workplace regulations is likely to be conditional on the receipt of
monetary or non-monetary gains. However, because the employer has the option of
staying with the national regulatory standard, this makes it likely that any gains to work
ers through rent transfer will be less than the additional gains to shareholders from
deregulation. In short, such a policy encourages value-enhancing choices by the firm
and workers, while constraining the extent of rent seeking.
Adoption of a conditional deregulation scheme , as outlined above, would be likely
to accelerate passage by Congress of waivable labor market mandates and employment
regulations. Moreover, such regulations would likely set more stringent standards and
contain fewer exemptions (based on company size and the like) than has been the case
in the past. More stringent regulations could be quite costly if there were no option to
waive coverage. Given the availability of an opt-out, however, those establishments
where regulations would prove costly are the ones most likely to agree on a mutually
preferred set of alternative standards. The hope is that over time more establishments
would create workers' associations that evolve along lines that provide an effective
vehicle for worker voice, encourage cooperation between management and its employ
ees, and facilitate value-enhancing changes in the workplace. The widespread creation
of worker associations may also provide the impetus for both fundamental changes in
and growth of labor unions in the private sector.

Changing the Labor Law Default. The second approach we consider would shift

the labor law default from its current setting of not unionized to some alternative invok-
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ing a governance structure providing independent worker voice. The default structure
could be waived or replaced following the joint approval of workers and management.
A point to emphasize is that choices of a labor law default and an employment regula
tion standard matter a lot, even where there exist procedures to modify those outcomes
(Sunstein, 2000). For example, current labor law has a nonunion default, but allows
majority worker choice of union representation. Imagine the opposite, with union rep
resentation the default, but workers free to reject representation by majority vote. In a
frictionless system in which preferences are unaffected by the initial allocation, one
might expect the two systems to produce the same outcomes. 34
Of course the NLRA union certification process is far from frictionless. Even
absent such frictions, however, evidence from behavioral economics ( Sunstein, 2000)
indicates that workers would be more likely to stick with their initial endowment (col
lective bargaining) than would have chosen to adopt it through free elections. Stated
alternatively, were union coverage the workplace default, far more than 1 0 percent of
private sector workers would remain unionized, even with frictionless decertification
elections.
What might be the outline of an alternative labor law default? It is not clear a pri
ori what would be the optimal default for a governance structure. But the choice is
important, since many workplaces will retain the default standard. Our own preference
would be a default that sets into motion the creation of some form of independent
worker association, although not one with full collective bargaining rights. As part of
any default set of rights, workers would retain their current right to form independent
labor unions (without management approval). It would be important that 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA be abolished or crippled. This would permit workers and firms to choose from
among a range of choices beyond either a traditional labor union or a nonunion work
place with no formal voice mechanism. We would also like the default mechanism to
designate some standardized procedure by which workers and management might dis
cuss, negotiate, and approve mutually beneficial changes.
Whatever the choice of a default, it will not function well in some (or many) work
places. The same is true for our current labor law default. In these workplaces, the
employer and workers (either in the form of unions or worker associations) have incen
tive to move away from the default and develop proposals for participatory workplace
governance structures that are value enhancing. Our proposal for a change in the
employment relations default can be combined with Levine's proposal for conditional
deregulation. One might have a default that establishes a relatively independent worker
association in the workplace. Management and workers could then make a joint deci
sion to opt-out of waivable federal workplace standards.
A benefit of changing the default is that it would encourage management, work
ers, and workers' agents (be they traditional unions or worker associations) to com
municate, negotiate, and arrive at alternatives that make all parties better off relative to
the default. It is clear that the current labor law default provides little incentive for man
agement or traditional unions to develop value-enhancing alternatives. An alternative
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default that permitted greater flexibility, be it through conditional deregulation or
nonunion worker associations, would encourage value-enhancing innovations.
Obviously, any major change in employment law and the default governance struc
ture requires thorough analysis and careful design. 35 The actual working of such a sys
tem will be determined in no small part by the way it evolves within the workplace,
courts, and regulatory agencies. For example, a shift in the default away from the
nonunion standard toward one emphasizing collective voice could readily shift too
much power to incumbent workers (insiders), leading to compensation levels incon
sistent with full employment. Our preference would be for a default that limits the abil
ity of worker associations or works councils to appropriate rents, but on the other hand
encourages communication and the evolution of value-enhancing arrangements (for a
discussion of such issues, see Freeman and Lazear, 1 995).
We reiterate that the most likely prospect for the future, or at least the near future,
is not some variant of the proposals discussed above, but continuation of the status quo.
It is simply not politically possible to get from where we are currently to a major change
in employment law. Such major changes cannot occur politically until there is strong
dissatisfaction with our current system and a consensus that change is likely to be ben
eficial. While such a consensus may exist among legal and industrial relations schol
ars, it does not exist among the public at large. We do not know what economic and
social changes might precipitate the emergence of a consensus for major changes in the
workplace.
VII. Conclusion
The outlook for private sector unions, at least in their current form, is bleak. The attrition
rate of union jobs (and workers) exceeds the rate at which workers are being organized.
Private sector union density, currently below 10 percent, will continue its decline until it
reaches a sustainable level. A marked improvement in the outlook for private unionism
will require a major shift in worker and public attitudes toward workplace collective
action, a substantial change in what unions do, or major innovations in policy regard
ing workplace governance structures. None of these is likely in the immediate future.
An important determinant of management resistance to unions and employment
change in unionized firms is how unions affect firm profitability and workplace per
formance. All evidence points to lower profits under unionism, with union effects on
productivity being insufficient to offset what are substantial wage premiums. Surpris
ingly, there is no consensus as to how union wage premiums have changed as private
sector union density has declined. For a given level of labor demand, there will an
inverse relationship between the union wage premium and membership. 36 If the demand
for union labor is shifting downward, however, there should be a positive relationship,
with the wage premium falling during a period of declining union density.
A contribution of this paper is the presentation of time-consistent estimates of the
private sector union wage premium for the years 1 973-1 999, based on work in Hirsch
and Schumacher (2000) . Several important results emerge from this research. First pri-
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vate sector union wage premiums are larger than public sector premiums, but over time
public sector premiums and the share of union members in the public sector have
increased. Hence, stability in the economy-wide union premium since the early 1 980s
masks what has been a decline in the private sector premium. Second, Census hot-deck
procedures used to impute the earnings of non-respondents in the CPS cause a sub
stantial downward bias in measures of the union-nonunion wage gap. Unbiased union
premiums are several percentage points higher than those commonly estimated and
presented in the research literature. Changes over time in the identification of imputed
earners in the CPS research files and changes in the proportion of workers with earn
ings imputed have led to misleading estimates of changes in the union premium. Con
trary to much previous evidence, union wage premiums were as high or higher in the
1 980s as they had been in the late 1 970s. Changes in the CPS beginning in 1 994
increased the number of workers with earnings imputed. Thus, downward bias in union
premium estimates since 1 994 has been particularly severe.
A third finding is that there exists large differences in the trend in union premiums
depending on whether one focuses on unadjusted (raw) wage figures or adjusted
(regression based) wage gaps, and whether or not one uses the CPS or ECI. Focusing
on the change in the union premium between 1 983 and 1 999, we find a substantial nar
rowing of the union-nonunion gap based on both unadjusted CPS earnings and pub
lished ECI figures (the ECI controls for changes in the industry and occupation mix but
not other worker characteristics). Time-consistent CPS regression analysis controlling
for worker characteristics, however, indicates that narrowing of the private sector union
premium has been rather modest. We conclude that our regression analysis provides
the preferred measure of the wage gap.
The modest decline in the union premium during a period in which union density
fell sharply implies that union rank and file have placed a heavy emphasis on main
taining wages, even though this accelerates the loss in membership. An emphasis on rent
seeking in an increasingly competitive world guarantees that labor unions, at least in
their traditional form, will continue their decline in the private sector. For the more than
90 percent of private sector workers who are not union members, worker voice and
participation in the workplace are sub-optimal. At the same time, there has been an
increased reliance on governmental regulations and mandates coupled with a litigious
enforcement process.
We argue that it is time to explore alternative workplace governance structures
that are likely to be value-enhancing, that increase worker voice and participation, that
constrain rent-seeking behavior, and that can vary across heterogeneous workplaces
and over time. We outline two possibilities - conditional deregulation and changing
the governance default in the workplace. Conditional deregulation (Levine, 1 995)
would permit an employer, with the approval of an independent worker association, to
waive some subset of federal workplace regulations. The second proposal would change
the governance default from one of no union to a default with some form of independ
ent workers' association. Such an association would be set up to provide voice but to
have limited rent-seeking power (workers would retain current rights to elect traditional
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union representation). Alternative workplace governance rules could then be selected
with the mutual agreement of the worker association and employer.
Perhaps in the not so distant future, there will emerge a consensus among union
leaders and policy makers that unionism as we know it will not rebound and that an
expanded role for worker voice in the private sector can occur only if there is adoption
and experimentation with new forms of worker representation. At that point, it may be
possible for politicians, business representatives, and organized labor to design and
rally public support for alternative forms of workplace governance. A movement in this
direction may lead not only to improvements in social welfare, but also to a revitaliza
tion of the labor union movement, albeit in a substantially altered form. Absent such a
consensus, we are likely to see a continued marginalization of unions in the private
sector, increasing governmental regulation of labor markets, and an underprovision of
value-enhancing voice in the workplace.

NOTES
*We particularly appreciate detailed suggestions received from Bruce Kaufman, as well as comments from
Jeffrey Hirsch and participants at the Roundtable on Labor Law, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law
and E conomics. Henry Farber kindly provided data for Figures 3 and 4.
1 For example, see Freeman (1 997), Farber and Western (2000) , and Lipset and Katchanovski (2001 ).
2Writing such a paper reminds one of physicist Niels Bohr's comment: "Prediction is difficult, particularly
of the future" (quoted in Levine, 1 995, p. 1 6 1 ). It is diffi cult enough to describe and understand the past
using accepted research methods and building on past research. Predicting the future is far less reliable. Just
as few predicted the meteoric rise in unionism in the middle third of last century, there were few during the
1950s and 1 960s predicting that private sector unionism would return to pre-NLRA levels by the end of the
century (Kaufman, 2001 ).
3The equivalent density figures among all private sector wage and salary workers (including agricultural)
are 24.2 percent, 1 6.5 percent, and 9.4 percent (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Table l b , p. 1 2). The percent

of private nonagricultural workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement are 18.8 percent in 1983 and

1 0.3 percent in 1 999 (coverage figures are not available until 1 977). Unless noted otherwise, all figures on
unionization were computed from the Current Population Survey (CPS) using methods identical to those by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as seen in January issues of Employment and
detail, see the Hirsch and Macpherson

Earnings. For more
Data Book, published annually by the Bureau of National Affairs.

4See, also, figures presented in Chaison and Dhavale ( 1 990). Farber and Western (2000) carefully analyze the
timing of the drop in certification elections. They conclude that the break in the election series began in the
month just prior the PATCO strike and well before the Dotson-led NLRB board. Although they reject the
PATCO strike as the proximate cause of the decline, they do not offer an explanation for the speed and mag
nitude of the drop. The early-1980s decline in organizing coincides with the run-up in the value of the dol
lar and a recession that hit particularly hard the goods-producing sector.
5 A high initial win rate following passage of the NLRA was expected since many election units had over

whelming worker support for representation. Over time, most election units were likely to have mixed pref
erences.
6Cited in Farber and Western (2000) is evidence from Weiler that the fraction of union wins resulting in first
contracts fel l from 86 percent in 1 955 to 63 percent in 1 980. The Dunlop Commission reports that a third or
more certified units fail to reach a first contract.
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7Farber and Western conclude that steady-state density is 2. 1 percent. They have adjusted their union figures
to reflect reporting error, which causes union density to be overstated (understated) when true density is less
(greater) than half. They rely on a misclassification rate reported by Card ( 1 996) of 2.7 percent for union and
nonunion workers. Bias would be zero if density were

SO percent, while upward bias in reported density

would increase to a limit of 2. 7 percent as true density reached zero. A "true" rate of 2. 1 percent corresponds
to a "reported" or measured density rate of about 4.5.
8For a surveys and analysis, see Addison and Hirsch ( 1 989), Booth ( 1 995), Hirsch ( 1997), and Kuhn ( 1998).
Were union wage premiums simply a tax on above-normal profits, their real effects might be small. But the
weight of the evidence is that unions tax the normal returns to capital and have real effects on investment and
employment growth. A recent survey has measured the views of labor economists at top universities. In
response to the question: "What is your best estimate of the percentage impact of unions on the productiv
ity of unionized companies" the median response was zero and mean response 3. 1 percent (Fuchs, Krueger,
and Poterba, 1 998, pp. 1392, 1 4 1 8). Absent a substantial productivity effect, union wage premiums lead to
lower profitability.
9For an overview of the literature on deregulation and earnings, see Peoples ( 1998).
1 0Large union-nonunion differences in performance need not imply large effects economy-wide, since
resources shift from nonunion to union sectors.
1 1 Quoting Kuhn ( 1 998, p. 1 039): "Like successful viruses, unions are smart enough not to kill their hosts."
1 2 An exception is construction, where the 1 977

Kiewit decision allowing "double-breasting" (nonunion sub

sidiaries of union contractors) played a major role in an unusually sharp decline in construction union den
sity (Allen, 1 994).
1 3For an analysis of the debate and views surrounding passage of the NLRA, see Kaufman ( 1996).
14Implicit in this argument is that employment regulation and workplace protection offered by unions are sub
stitutes, in the sense that greater government provision reduces demand for union organizing. This view need
not be inconsistent with the finding that unionization and regulation are supplementary in the production of
workplace safety enforcement (Wei!, 1 99 1) and workers' compensation claims (Hirsch et a!., 1 997).
1 5For attempts at measuring the substitution between government policies and changes in union membership,
see Neumann and Rissman ( 1 984) and Stepino and Fiorito ( 1 986). For a survey of the economic effects of
workplace mandates and employment regulation, see Addison and Hirsch ( 1 997).
1 6We say unlikely for three reasons. First, union wages positively affect density through their impact on
nonunion worker preferences for organizing. But union wages negatively affect density through their impact
on management opposition to organizing

and through employment in existing union establishments. Second,

there is typically a queue or excess supply of qualified workers who would like to obtain union jobs, but can
not. This implies that were union wages lower, employment and membership would increase. Third, the U.S.
has the lowest and most rapidly declining union density among OECD countries, while having the highest
union wage premium (B lanchftower and Freeman, 1 992), supporting the thesis of a negative wage-density
relationship.
1 7This is the relationship emphasized by Linneman et a!. ( 1 990), who find the largest declines in union den
sity in industries with the highest union premiums.
18 A shift to

D� does not necessarily lead to a lower preferred wage. For example,

if the median union mem

ber is not threatened by unemployment and acts in a selfish manner, union wage demands may not decline.
Empirical evidence in coal and newspaper printing, however, suggests that "monopoly unions" give a con
siderable weight to employment (Booth, 1 995, pp.

I 0 1 - 108). Moreover, real-world outcomes are determined

by bargaining rather than a monopoly union, making it even more likely that a downward demand shift results
in a lower union wage.
19Union density may also decrease owing to declining worker preferences for collective bargaining. This

need not affect the wage premium, apart from the effect that industry density has on union bargaining power
(see below).
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C to C shifts the contract zone down in wage space, leading to a lower contract wage if

relative bargaining power remains unchanged.
2 1Union threat effects should be nonlinear, with weak effects on wages at very low and high levels of den
sity (Corneo and Lucifora, 1 997).
22Log differentials are similar to percentage differences at absolute values smaller than about . 1 5 . Log dif
ferentials can be converted to (approximate) percentages by [exp(d)- 1 ] 1 00, where d is the log differential.
We ignore problems with respect to the estimation of union premiums, such as specification, the endogene
ity of union status, unmeasured worker and job attributes, and employer-employee selection on skills and pref
erences (Card, 1 996; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998).
23Estimates of gender-specific means above the cap for 1 973- 1 999 are shown in Hirsch and Macpherson

(2000, p. 6). These values are approximately 1 . 5 times the cap, with smaller female means and modest growth
over time.
24Wage gap estimates with respect to match criteria (e.g., schooling, gender, occupation) are not biased.
25Absent adjustment for the imputed earnings bias, we obtain unadjusted union wage gap estimates of .345
in 1 983 and .210 in 1 999 (a . 1 35 log point decline), as compared to the differentials .386 and .276 reported
in Figure 6.
26The downward bias from the Census imputation procedure is largest in years since 1 994, so our correction
for the bias leads not only to higher union wage gap estimates, but a

smaller decline in the gap than would

result absent the correction. Despite the seeming clarity of these results, they stand in contrast to the view
that the union wage gap shows little trend (Blanchflower 1 999; Bratsberg and Ragan, 1 999). Hirsch and
Macpherson (2000) find a small change in the

economy-wide wage gap, as compared to a decline in the pri
public sector union

vate sector gap. The seeming constancy of the overall gap is the result of an increasing

differential coupled with an increasing proportion of union members over time being in the public sector.
27See the note to Figure 6 for details of how the ECI differentials are calculated. Katz and Krueger ( 1 999,
BPEA, Table 1 4) cite evidence on ECI total

compensation growth for union and nonunion workers.

28Bratsberg and Ragan ( 1 999) use a more detailed industry breakdown and find lower dispersion in the CPS
wage premium, but little change in the aggregate level. The ECI also provides broad breakdowns for goods
producing versus service-producing sectors and manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing, each classified by
union status. Relative union-nonunion wage growth differs little across these broad sectors, again indicating
that employment shifts and industry heterogeneity play a minor role in accounting for changes over time in
the union wage gap.
29This sentiment is expressed in a recent

Business Week column: "A whole generation of unionists settled for

this strategy: protecting senior unionized workers, knowing that their numbers would diminish over time"
(Kuttner, 2000).
30Empirical evidence on the effects of workplace mandates is surveyed in Addison and Hirsch ( 1 997). Dis
cussion of labor law reforms is beyond the scope of our paper. Among the recommendations proposed by the
recent Dunlop Commission were: narrowing the definition of supervisory and managerial workers who are
exempt from the NLRA, shortening the time between the call for union elections and conduct of the elec
tions, increased access of workers to union organizers, procedures such as mediation to facilitate newly cer
tified unions to achieve first contracts, and fast injunctive relief against discriminatory action by employers.
For examples of labor law reforms that generally promote "value-added" unionism, see Estreicher ( 1 996).
31 Such reforms might include profit sharing or plant-level bargaining, each of which might make the demands
of the median union member more sensitive to firm performance (we thank Bruce Kaufman for these sug
gestions).
32Abowd ( 1 989b) defines the value of the "enterprise" as the sum of firm market value plus worker rents. For
a change to be value enhancing to the parties, we mean that the value of the enterprise has increased.
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33The TEAM Act, passed by Congress but vetoed by President Clinton in July 1996, would have limited the
scope of 8(a)(2) and allowed employer-organized and employer-funded worker participation groups in
nonunion plants and offices. Levine would continue protections that prevent creation of "company unions."
For evidence on how company unions worked prior to passage of the NLRA, see Kaufman (2000).
34We ignore the issue of obtaining first contracts, regarding majority approval as leading to union coverage.
35Relevant will be the experience that other countries have had with worker councils and alternative forms
of organization. For a recent analysis and references, see Addison et a\. (2000).
36As noted previously, when settlements are on a vertical contract curve this holds only in the

long run.
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